Michigan Law Review
Volume 98

Issue 6

2000

Saying No to Stakeholding
Jeffrey S. Lehman
University of Michigan Law School

Deborah C. Malamud

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Education Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law
and Society Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeffrey S. Lehman & Deborah C. Malamud, Saying No to Stakeholding, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1482 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol98/iss6/7

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

SAYING NO TO STAKEHOLDING
Jeffrey S. Lehman*
Deborah C. Malamud**

By Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott.
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1999. Pp.xi, 296. $26.

THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY.

"What if America were to make good on its promise of equal opportunity
by [XXX]? That's the bold proposal set forth by Yale law professors
Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott .."1
.

.

The quotation above is from the Yale University Press announce
ment describing Bruce Ackerman2 and Anne Alstott's3 new book, with
one change: we have substituted "[XXX]" for the authors' catch
phrase summary of their proposal. What do you think the missing
words might be? How would you enable America "to make good on
its promise of equal opportunity"?
As you ponder that question, you might consider the following fea
ture of the Ackerman/Alstott proposal. It calls for the federal gov
ernment to spend an additional $255 billion per year (p. 35). Perhaps
that is not surprising; perhaps you might have trouble spending much
less if you wanted to make good on the promise of equal opportunity.
So what would Ackerman and Alstott do?
We believe that it is easiest to grasp the full import of their pro
posal by considering its impact on the lives of five hypothetical young
Americans. Below is each individual's situation without the
Ackerman/Alstott plan:
., Alan is born to a single mother in a desperately poor neighbor
hood of Chicago. His mother dropped out of high school and
works odd jobs at minimum wage. They live in a housing project.
Without the Ackerman and Alstott plan, he receives inadequate
health care and a very poor education in the public schools. He

* Dean of the Law School and Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of
Michigan. A.B. 1977, Cornell; M.P.P. 1981, J.D. 1981, University of Michigan. - Ed.
** Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1977, Wesleyan; J.D.1986, Uni
versity of Chicago. - Ed.

1. Forty Acres, A Mule, and $80,000: Making Equal Opportunity a Reality, YALE BOOK
NEWS (Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, CT) (announcing the April 12, 1999 publication date
for THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY), at 1.

2. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School.
3. Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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drops out of school in the tenth grade and lives his adult life on
the fringe of the formal economy.
•

Bonita is born overseas in a poor developing country. Her family
emigrates to the United States when she is twelve, settling in
Arlington, Virginia. Without the Ackerman and Alstott plan,
Bonita receives adequate health care and a decent public school
education. She learns English quickly and is an excellent student
in high school. Her parents have trouble finding jobs that pay
well enough to support the family, but they manage. Upon
graduation, Bonita cannot take the risk of borrowing money for
college for fear that she will become dependent on her family.
She decides to go right to work as a legal secretary.
·

•

•

•

Carolyn is born to a working-class couple in Pittsburgh. Her par
ents rent a comfortable apartment in a safe neighborhood. They
have no accumulated wealth and live frugally, but they are able to
make ends meet. Without the Ackerman and Alstott plan, she
receives acceptable health care through her father's company
HMO and a tolerable public school education. She is not a par
ticularly strong student, but she finishes high school. She works
in retail sales for four years before going back to community col
lege for two years, eventually becoming a medical technician.
Dierdre is born to a middle-class academic couple in Newton,
Massachusetts. Her parents make monthly mortgage payments
on a comfortable house in a safe neighborhood. Without the
Ackerman and Alstott plan, she receives very good health care
and a fine education in an excellent suburban public school sys
tem. She is not a particularly strong student in high school, so she
attends and completes her four years of college at the University
of Massachusetts - a good school, to be sure, but not as prestig
ious or as highly regarded as the most selective private universi
ties her top-of-the-class high school friends attend. She does well
there, majoring in economics. With help from her family, she se
cures a two-year entry-level job in her field, and then earns an
M.B.A. from Columbia. She becomes a successful financial ana
lyst for a large mutual fund group.
Edward is born to a wealthy professional couple in New York
City. He grows up in a Greenwich Village brownstone. Without
the Ackerman and Alstott plan, he enjoys the privileges of
wealth: the finest health care extant, private nannies and tutors,
elite private education from kindergarten through high school,
box seats at the Yankees and the Metropolitan Opera, worldwide
travel in limousines and on private jets. He is a superb student,
goes to Yale College and Yale Law School, joins a top-ranked
law firm (one with which his family has been associated for gen-

1484

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:1482

erations), moves in-house with a major corporation, and eventu
ally becomes its C.E.O.
These stylized hypotheticals capture a disquieting truth about
American society: we do not have equal opportunity. Some
Americans barely have the shadow of a chance to succeed; some must
live with the consequences of their mistakes; some find their mistakes
forgiven; others are insulated from ever making mistakes at all. For
some Americans, the prospect of an upper-middle-class adulthood is
extremely remote; for others it is virtually assured; in between, there is
an enormous range.
So, here is what Ackerman and Alstott would do:
1. Each of the five children would grow up in the same circum
stances that he or she would have grown up in without the plan. There
would be absolutely no change in any child's circumstances until his or
her eighteenth birthday, at the very earliest.
2. As soon as they reach their eighteenth birthdays, Dierdre and
Edward (and any other college-bound young adult) would each re
ceive $20,000 cash each year from the federal government, for four
consecutive years, for an undiscounted total of $80,000 (this $80,000
"stake," received over four years, is the source of the book's title).
3. As soon as she reaches her twenty-first birthday, Carolyn (and
any other high school graduate who does not attend college) would re
ceive $20,000 cash each year from the federal government, for four
consecutive years. She would also receive three years' worth of inter
est on each payment, to reflect that she had to wait longer than
Dierdre and Edward to get her money.
4. As soon as he reaches his twenty-first birthday, Alan (and any
other high school dropout who has not been convicted of a serious fel
ony) would receive $4,000 cash each year from the federal govern
ment, for as long as he remains crime-free. In addition, he could have
more immediate access to up to the "full" $80,000 in distributions
from the federal government, but only for certain limited purposes:
buying a house, going back to school, or paying extraordinary medical
expenses.
5. Bonita will never be eligible to receive a stake. Only citizens
are eligible for stakeholding, and even a citizen must have lived in the
United States for at least eleven of her first twenty-one years to qual
ify. She will fall short by two years and get nothing.4

4. The same rule applies to young adults born in the United States of America to par
ents whose families spend too many years abroad pursuing private-sector overseas interests.
The reason for the rule in cases like Bonita's is political expediency; the reason for its exten
sion to the American-born is the possibility of constitutional challenge. See pp. 46-47.
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This program of stake distribution is the core of the
Ackerman/Alstott plan, and we shall henceforth refer to it as AAP
AAP is part of a larger program that includes other elements as well
- a payback scheme (pp. 77-93), a financing scheme (pp. 94-112), and
a related but severable program for retirement funding (pp. 129-54).
But AAP is enough to occupy us here.
It seems self-evident to us that AAP cannot begin to "make good
on America's promise of equal opportunity." In many ways it would
seem to distribute opportunity even less equally than it is distributed
today. Thus, in our example, Alan and Bonita would seem to be even
more disadvantaged relative to Edward and Dierdre than they are
without AAP Edward and Deirdre would have started life with social
and economic advantages even without their stakes; stakeholding adds
to their existing resources. Alan and Bonita started out disadvantaged
and are made relatively more so in relation to stakeholders in their
age cohort: Bonita because she has no stake, and Alan because re
strictions on his access to stake funds diminish his ability to put them
to good economic use.5
So what exactly is going on in this book? We shall approach that
question in two steps. First, we argue that AAP is best understood not
as a counterproductive plan for equalizing opportunity (which, we
admit, was our first reaction to it), but rather as the legitimate off
spring of two normative impulses: Ackerman and Alstott's commit
ment to "antipatemalistic liberalism" and their desire for "fair oppor
tunity." Second, we take a critical look at some aspects of the authors'
self-presentation that, in all candor, stand in the way of efforts to give
the book the generous reading any serious work of scholarship de
serves.
.

.

5. There is no reason to think that schooling, house-buying, and extraordinary medical
expenses are the only, or even the most, sensible uses of funds for non-high-school-graduates
seeking to survive in the market. For example, it would be a perfectly rational use of stake
principal, in communities with poor public transportation, for dropouts to use stake principal
to purchase and maintain a car as an aid in gaining and keeping employment. Other rational
uses of stake principal abound that the authors exclude. And the alternatives they permit
might be among the least sensible. As to home-buying, it is highly unlikely that high school
dropouts will have the savings or credit ratings to purchase homes. See Statistical Abstract
of the United States Table No. 756 (stating that median yearly earnings for persons with 9 to
12 years of education but no diploma are $16,818 for males and $8,861 for females). And
they may well not be able to afford homes in neighborhoods in which house values keep
pace with general market inflation. If dropouts do buy homes, they may rapidly lose their
equity if they cannot use their stake principal to cover mortgage payments and other ex
penses during spells of unemployment. As to medical expenses, impoverished high school
dropouts with children may be eligible for Medicaid, which since 1996 has operated on dif
ferent terms from cash welfare. See generally <http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/meligib.htm>.
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***

The Stakeholder Society makes many references to the ideal of
equal opportunity, but these references are not the proper point of en
try into the book. To understand Ackerman and Alstott, one should
begin with their statement that they stand for a "new liberalism."
They want to combine "a commitment to individualism" with "an ap
preciation of the pervasive impact of economic inequality" (pp. 21-22).
To discern what the authors mean by "individualism," it is helpful
to look outside the covers of The Stakeholder Society, and back to
Ackerman's 1980 book, Social ]U,Stice in the Liberal State. In that
book, he elaborated a particular brand of individualism as the central
premise of liberalism, namely, "the liberal's opposition to paternal
ism."6 In the course of that elaboration, he set forth a series of inter
related ideas.
First, Ackerman presented his idea of undominated conversation:
"A power structure is illegitimate if it can be justified only through a
conversation in which some person (or group) must assert that he is
(or they are) the privileged moral authority . . . ."7 What kinds of con
versational moves should be considered an assertion that one is "the
privileged moral authority"? For Ackerman, such a move is one that
violates his "Neutrality Principle":
No reason is a good reason if it requires the power holder to assert:
(a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any
of his fellow citizens, or
(b) that, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically
superior to one or more of his fellow citizens.8
Under this Neutrality Principle, one may thus claim neither intrin
sic superiority over one's dialogic partner nor access to a superior con
ception of the good. Ackerman called for a liberal state structured to
effectuate that Neutrality Principle as follows:
A political community of diverse individuals can organize its power
struggle consistently with Neutral discourse if it takes steps to assure
that:
a. No citizen genetically dominates another.
b. Each citizen receives a liberal education.
c. Each citizen begins adult life under conditions of material equality.
d. Each citizen can freely exchange his initial entitlements within a
flexible transactional network.

6. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 {1980). Anne
Alstott also embraces antipatemalistic liberalism in her recent writing. See Anne Alstott,
Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE LJ. 967 {1999).
7. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 10-11.
8. Id. at 11.
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e. Each citizen, at the moment of his death, can assert that he has ful
filled his obligations of liberal trusteeship, passing on to the next
generation a power structure no less liberal than the one he himself
enjoyed.
If a social world fulfilled all these conditions, I shall say that its inhabi
tants enjoy the condition of undominated equality that is required by an
undeviating insistence on liberal dialogic legitimacy.9
Note here that within Ackerman's conception, the words ."undomi
nated" and "equality" are linked.. Indeed, it is fair to say that the pri
mary form of equality sought by Ackerman is a world in which people
are equally undominated.
Equal distribution of wealth at birth,
equally available education, and other equalities are means to the end
of equal undomination.
Of course, the inhabitants of our world are far from enjoying the
condition of undominated equality prescribed by Ackerman's
" 'perfect' technology of justice."10 The real world is one in which
some people inherit genetically determined illnesses and impairments
that put them in a poor position to compete in liberal markets. Our
real-world system of racial and gender inequality disadvantages those
who are born nonwhite or nonmale. Our real-world educational sys
tem fails to deliver to many even the most basic literacy and numeracy
skills, let alone the capacity to participate in liberal political dialogue.
And material inequality is so entrenched in our real world that only
the most radically expropriatory . redistributive policies could set it
straight, and - significantly for Ackerman - the resulting equality
would last only until two sets of parents made choices that created ma
terially unequal circumstances for their respective offspring.
Those concerned with the real world, Ackerman argued, must de
velop second-best and third-best compromises.
The Stakeholder
Society is instructively read as an experiment in compromise within
the terms set forth by Social Justice in the Liberal State.
One can, of course, imagine many .different ways to strike com
promises in the real world. For example, one QJ.ight say that until the
first three of Ackerman's five conditions11 are satisfied, we should re
lax the fourth condition (free exchange) and we should be willing to
allow society collectively to act paternalistically. More concretely, one
might say that in order to promote a world of material equality at birth
and liberal education throughout a person's formative years, our soci
ety ought to override the choices that parents would otherwise make
about how to live their lives and spend their resources.
Ackerman and Alstott do not want to go there. They find "tradi
tional forms of bureaucratic control" unattractive (pp. 9-10). They

9. Id. at 28.
10. Id.
11. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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want "to break the hold of a familiar vision of the welfare state in
America" (p. 8). They do not want to "transform stakeholding into
yet another exercise in paternalistic social engineering" (p. 9) and
"create an excuse for a vast new bureaucracy intervening in our lives"
(pp. 9-10).
In sum, Ackerman and Alstott want to propose a system that
makes compromises, but does not compromise the antipaternalistic
vision of individualism. The "undeviating" commitment in this project
is to avoid having to say to a citizen, "I won't let you do what you want
with the resources you have, however you may have come by them."
It should be "up to each citizen - not the government - to decide
how she will use" her resources (p. 3). Ideally, for Ackerman and
Alstott, this rule applies not only to resources that citizens earn them
selves, but also to resources that citizens obtain through government
transfers. For Ackerman and Alstott, the phrase "economic indepen
dence for all" (p. 11) does not mean freedom from dependency on the
wage market.12 It means freedom from bureaucratic restrictions on
one's economic choices.
Of course, a rigid hands-off approach to individual choice is diffi
cult to square with equal opportunity in a society that respects the
family as a fundamental, autonomous unit of child socialization.13
Newborns cannot spend money without help; some guardian familial or governmental - must do the spending for them. In this
country, we leave that to parents. Yet, even if all parents in fact
wanted to spend money in ways that would maximize their children's
life chances (and of course they do not), not every parent would
choose to do so in the same way (for starters, nobody really knows
what it means to speak of "maximizing" a child's life chances). So in
the end, children will reach adulthood in different positions.
In Social Justice in the Liberal State, Ackerman argued that "un
dominated equality" requires that each citizen begin adult life under
conditions of material equality.14 That, of course, won't happen in the
real world. And so, Ackerman and Alstott set for themselves the sec
ond-best goal of allowing each citizen to begin adult life under condi
tions of fair opportunity. The "liberal state . . . must . . . assure each
citizen a level playing field when he enters the marketplace as an
adult. Without this fair start, individual freedom for some is oppres
sion for others" (p. 22).
So, what is a "fair start"? What makes for a "level playing field" in
adulthood? We read Ackerman and Alstott's understanding of these

12. For further discussion of this phrase, see infra text accompanying notes 15-16.
13. See generally, e.g., JAMES s. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE
FAMILY {1983).
14. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 28.
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ideas as having both static and dynamic elements. The static element
has to do with ensuring that (almost) everyone is placed above a mor
ally significant baseline. The dynamic element has to do with ensuring
that (almost) everyone is given incentives for which they can be held
morally accountable.
In its static sense, the notion of a "fair start" calls for us to examine
where young adults end up under AAP As we noted above, AAP has
a tripartite benefits structure for its eligible beneficiaries - different
benefits are bestowed upon the college-bound student, the non
college-bound high school graduate, and the high school dropout.15
Short-tenured immigrants - like Bonita - get nothing, and teenagers
who commit crimes face the possibility of partial- or full-stake forfei
ture (pp. 49-51). That structure obviously does not create a "level
playing field" in a literal sense. Those most deeply injured by child
hood inequality may find themselves caught up in the criminal justice
system and will get no stake. Those who do not graduate from high
school will only be able to use a small yearly allowance from their
stake fund, for limited purposes that may not address their economic
needs, and they will be substantially wors'e off, for that reason, than
those who graduate from high school. High school graduates who are
the only stakeholders in their poor families may yield to social pres
sure and share their stakes, leaving little for their own needs. Better
off high school stakeholders may keep their stakes for themselves, but
they will remain worse off than college graduates whose stakes, at the
very least, have assured them a larger income stream. Those whose
financial resources are exhausted by college costs will be worse off
than those for whom the college degree is just one more asset in a
family-funded portfolio. Stakeholding raises the absolute level of
economic resources available to all but the bottommost group, but
keeps the other groups at the same distance from one another.
What Ackerman and Alstott are seeking, however, is a level play
ing field in a moral rather than an economic sense. They are estab
lishing, for us and for themselves, a morally significant level of eco
nomic endowment - a minimum standard above which differences in
resources bear no moral relevance. They want to "revitalize the lib
eral ideal of an independent, responsible, property-owning citizenry"
(p. 46) - a concept in which a more robust model of economic equal
ity has little place. "[E]conomic independence" (p. 24), in their narrow
sense, means having the minimum resources necessary to avoid
"short-termism" (p. 35) in the making of key life decisions in early
adulthood. Once that minimum is provided, stakeholders are to be
.

15. Whether or not one thinks the benefits are economically equivalent (because the
AAP has somehow hit upon the perfect discount rate), they are nonetheless different. For a
discussion of discount rates, see infra text accompanying note 23.
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held fully accountable for their choices and results. Differences in re
sources above the minimum do not enter the moral calculus at all.
This minimum-standards notion of what "a level playing field"
looks like does, in fact, have its place in American culture. One ver
sion of the American conception of class is predicated on the notion
that distinctions above an approved minimum make no difference.
Once one is not poor in America, one is middle-class.16 All middle
class people are assumed to be "solid individual achievers in an essen
tially classless society composed of human beings engaged in bettering
themselves."17 Those at the top of the middle class are presumed not
to have gotten there by oppressing those at the bottom. All are seen
as having real possibilities for economic mobility (downward or up
ward), and, in this minimum-standards sense, all play on "a level
playing field" (p. 22). In that sense, Ackerman and Alstott get the cul
ture just right.
But it would be a serious mistake to take at face value the
American myth that all those who are not poor are basically the same.
Notwithstanding that myth, Americans are capable of being ex
quisitely sensitive to differences in resources and their reflection in
patterns of consumption.18 The advertising industry has a detailed,
empirically based sense of how subtle differences in consumption
choices map onto important and durable social distinctions.19 That
these relationships are superficially manipulable to a degree - we
can, after all, use the short-term strategy of going into debt to appear
better off than we are - does not make them less real.20
Furthermore, even unperceived differences can have significant ef
fects in the real world. A working-class parent may be satisfied with
her child's high school because it offers one or two advanced place16. Americans lack a stable conception of a "working class," in part because for so many
years the collar-color line was cross-cut by the income line (in the case of the high-earning
unionized craft and industrial workers). For struggles over line-drawing for purposes of
wage and hour legislation, as an example of the legal consequences of the complexity of class
in the United States, see Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line
Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212 (1998).
17. BENJAMIN DEMOIT, THE IMPERIAL MIDDLE: WHY AMERICANS CAN'T THINK
STRAIGHT ABOUT CLASS 43 (1990).
18. See, e.g., PAUL FuSSELL, CLASS: A GUIDE THROUGH THE AMERICAN STATUS
SYSTEM 77-78 (1983); Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and
Caveats, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 1847, 1883-85 (1996). Americans use absolute meanings of class
(e.g., middle class means a managerial position or a college degree) for some purposes and
"a relative-comparisons model that ranks people along a continuum of social standing" for
others. See REEVE VANNEMAN & LYNN WEBER CANNON, THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION
OF CLASS 145 (1987).
19. See, e.g., Kenneth Labich, Class in America, FORTUNE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 114, 116.
20. Groups differ in their ability to develop "symbolic strategies . . . to jam" the mes
sages of class distinction: the middle classes have it, while the lower classes do not. Pierre
Bourdieu, What Makes a Social Class: On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups,
32 BERKELEY J. Soc. 1, 12 (1987).
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ment courses and sends a healthy percentage of its graduates to the
local state college. She may herself have grown up in a poorer neigh
borhood with worse schools, and all she sees is her family's upward
mobility. That same parent may not be aware that the best suburban
high school in the area offers twenty advanced placement courses, and
sends a large proportion of its graduates to top private colleges and to
the state's flagship university campus. These differences will matter to
her child's life chances, even if she is protected by social segregation
from having any knowledge of them.
The data about income mobility during adulthood confirm the ex
tent to which differences in starting points define different opportunity
sets for Americans today. An adult between the ages of 22 and 39
who was in the bottom fifth of the income distribution in 1968 had
only a 20% chance of being in the top 40% in 1991; an adult who was
in the top fifth had a 72% chance of being in the top 40% twenty-three
years later.21
Ultimately, we find it difficult to accept the notion that under AAP
all of the remaining tilts in the playing field are morally irrelevant.
But before we can say that we disagree with Ackerman and Alstott's
claim that AAP creates a "fair start" (p. 22), we must consider the dy
namic aspect of that term. The authors claim, and not without reason,
that AAP will create a new incentive structure for long-tenured citi
zens at the threshold of adulthood. (For Bonita and those in her situa
tion, AAP unfortunately creates no new behavior incentives.) The
authors contend that AAP's differential treatment of Alan (the high
school dropout) and Carolyn (the stake-eligible high school graduate
who does not attend a four-year college) is "fair" because it is a mor
ally acceptable consequence of the choices they made.
The dynamic sense of a "fair start" calls for us to examine whether
AAP's static inequalities, both preserved and created, are morally ac
ceptable consequences of individuals' prior behavioral choices.
Ackerman and Alstott clearly believe they are. The best evidence
comes from their treatment of people who do not complete high
school and therefore are ineligible for an $80,000 "stake."
Ackerman and Alstott would offer those who stay crime-free but
do not finish high school a lifelong allowance of $4,000 per year.22
Four thousand dollars a year is the economic equivalent of $80,000,
but only if one uses a 5% discount rate; if one uses a discount rate de
rived from, say, the S&P 500, $4,000 a year is worth only about

21. See Peter Gottschalk & Sheldon Danziger, Family Income Mobility: How Much ls
There and Has It Changed? 19 Focus, Summer-Fall 1998, at 20, 22 tbl. 2.
22. Those who do not graduate from high school have access to the full $80,000 for cer
tain paternalistically limited purposes. See supra note 5 for an explanation of why those
limitations are unwise.
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$36,000.23 Clearly, then, those who do not graduate from high school
are financially punished for their failings by AAP. Ackerman and
Alstott ground this decision in the proposition that such Americans
have proved themselves to be lacking in "self-discipline" (p. 9) and
therefore incapable of managing a stake.
The authors seem to assume that self-discipline is the primary fac
tor influencing high school graduation. But that assumption would
seem to call for more evidence than Ackerman and Alstott provide.
Why does self-discipline have more explanatory power than conflict in
the home environment, violent neighborhoods and high schools, in
adequate primary education, learning disabilities, or any of the myriad
factors that correlate poverty with noncompletion of high school? Is
there any evidence, using our hypothetical examples, that a Carolyn,
who decides to finish high school, has more self-discipline than an
Alan, who sees the inadequacy of his school and concludes that an ex
tra two years of schooling in that environment won't aid his economic
survival?24
To be sure, it may well be that a poor teenager who completes a
sorely inadequate high school program has more self-discipline than
one who does not.25 But why is that the relevant comparison? It takes
far less self-discipline to finish high school when your school creates a
positive environment and when you come from a middle-class family
that fully supports your right to have a childhood protected from out
side demands.
Moreover, if one's primary concern is with self-discipline, high
school graduation seems a poor proxy for opposite reasons as well.
The AAP does not seek out signs of lack of self-discipline among mid
dle-class youth - for example, the "gentleman-C" record collected by
a child capable of far better work. In our example, Dierdre is not
punished for attending the University of Massachusetts because she
failed to apply herself to her studies seriously enough to earn a spot at
one of the Ivies. There is no suggestion of taking stakes away from the
least self-disciplined young adults. Rather, they would be taken away
23. The average rate of return on a diversified portfolio of large company stocks from
the beginning of 1926 to the end of 1997 was 11 % per year. See Ibbotson Assocs., Stocks,
Bonds, Bills, and Inflation: 1998 Yearbook app. C, tbl. C-1 at 271 {1998).

24. Note that Ackerman and Alstott fear that tying the stake to high school graduation
will create enormous incentives for schools to lower graduation standards, and they would
require high school graduates to pass a federal or state stake-eligibility examination in order
to become stakeholders. See p 38 n.*. The authors nowhere acknowledge that poorer stu
dents attending poorer schools are far less likely to pass such an examination than are mid
dle-class students, and that African-American students are particularly likely to be disadvan
taged by the hypothetical tests. On the latter point, see THE BLACK-WHITE TEsT SCORE
GAP {Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998).
25. Even that is not certain. The high school graduate may have had fewer immediate
wage-earning options to lure him away from school, or may have felt less responsibility to
bring money into the household as soon as possible.
.
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from those (mostly poor) young adults who have not managed to earn
high school diplomas.26
You get the idea. Only if non-high-school-graduates' failings are
their own moral fault and college-attenders are morally blameless
does it make sense in moral terms to deny a full stake to the former
while granting a full stake to the latter. Neither condition is met.
So what if we could persuade the authors that their denial of a
"stake" to some young adults is indefensible, and they agreed to drop
the restrictions? Would we then have a program of "fair opportu
nity"?
At this juncture it is appropriate to consider the manner in which
the authors derive the amount of their proposed stake: $80,000.
Ackerman and Alstott arrive at the $80,000 figure from the cost of tui
tion at the average private college: $18,071 a year for four years.27
They then state:

As we have seen, eighty thousand dollars is enough to pay for four years
of tuition at the average private college in the United States . . . .
Four years at college will not magically eliminate the need for hard
choices about career, family, and the meaning of life. Nonetheless, the
skills and self-understandings that these students will gain will place them
in a fair position to take responsibility for these choices. At the very
least, they will not be locked into dead-end jobs or locked out of the vast
range of cultural opportunities open to them as citizens of the twenty
first century. In a rough-and-ready way, a college education serves to re
deem the promise of maturity in contemporary society.
But if this is so, eighty thousand dollars should also set the standard
for the three out of four Americans who don't earn bachelor's degrees.
As equal citizens, they too are entitled to confront their adult years with
their heads held high while preparing themselves for the future as they
see fit. . . . [I]f eighty thousand dollars suffices to provide the top quarter
of the population with effective economic independence, shouldn't all
other Americans obtain equivalent resources? [pp. 58-59; footnote omit
ted]
Here we begin to see the gears spinning in the authors' heads, and we
can understand some of the motivations for AAP. The authors are
clearly concerned by the financial difficulties that middle-class stu
dents face today when they attend private colleges. Federally guaran
teed Stafford Loans of up to $18,500 per year can only cover tuition;

26. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the eventual dropout
rates in 1997 for grades 10-12, ages 15-24, were 12% for children from low-income families,
4% for children from middle-income families, and 2% for children from high-income fami
lies. Philip Kaufman et al., DROPOUT RATES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1997 (U.S. Dep't of
Educ. NCES 1999-082, 1999). Note here that Ackerman and Alstott are careful to suggest
that degree requirements need to be kept tight, and would happily require tests. See p. 38
n.*. That would make it even harder for the poor, given the poor quality of schools available
to them, to obtain eligibility for their stakes.
27. P. 55.
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living expenses must be financed in other ways. Students are emerg
ing with unprecedentedly high levels of debt - levels that might well
seem to compromise our sense that "the promise of maturity" has
been redeemed.
So why not do what other countries do? Why not provide a free
college education for those who are admitted?
One problem is that in most of those countries the free college
education is available only at public institutions, and Ackerman and
Alstott would like to ensure that the best and the brightest students
(like Dierdre's Harvard- and Yale-bound classmates) have opportuni
ties to select freely among America's many fine private institutions
and are not restricted to choosing among the elite public institutions,
most of which charge high tuition to nonresidents in any event. The
only remaining possibility is some form of voucher, and that is the ba
sis for AAP: at its core, one finds a $20,000 per year federal college
education voucher. And its major effect will likely be to shift enroll
ment from public to private universities.28
It is illuminating to consider why Ackerman and Alstott did not
stop there. What would have been wrong with a proposal simply to
provide vouchers to cover the cost of college for any student who gets
in (with repayment obligations along the lines spelled out in the
book)? The answer clearly has to do with the fact that not everyone
gets admitted to a college, and with some sense that it would be unfair
to help those fortunate high school graduates who do without helping
the unfortunates who do not.
The unfairness here is not so obvious as one might assume. One
might defend subsidized college as a kind of cost equalization system.
After all, young adults who attend college face a set of expenses that
are not incurred by high school graduates who do not attend. And it is
not self-evidently unfair to eliminate those cost barriers for all those
who must face them without doing anything for those whose lives do
not carry such added costs.
Ultimately, however, we are no more persuaded by that argument
than are Ackerman and Alstott. For college attendance is a mixed
good, part public (the entire society benefits if some of its citizens
have advanced educations) and part private. But the private aspect
predominates. The person who is educated captures most of the re
turns to education, and those returns provide an excellent return on
the investment in tuition.29 While it might be important for the gov-

28. At present 75% of Americans do not earn four-year college degrees, see pp. 51, 58,
and Ackerman and Alstott assume that 73% will not attend four-year colleges even after
stakeholding goes into effect, see p. 220. So the main use of the money will be not to create
new college graduates, but to broaden the choices of those who would already have gone to
college.
29. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Alan Krueger, Estimates of the Economic Return to
Schooling from a New Sample of Twins, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1157, 1171 (1994) (predicting
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ernment to take steps to ensure that credit is available for all who
would attend college, or perhaps to ensure that need-based subsidies
exist, there would seem to be no cause for an across-the-board subsidy
for those who would invest in an already profitable enterprise.
A different defense might describe subsidized college as a hard
eamed prize for the meritorious. If a race is fair, then there is nothing
wrong with providing a prize for the winner and not the loser. Yet we
surely understand why Ackerman and Alstott might not want to rest
on that notion either. As we have noted earlier, whatever else they
may be, the first eighteen years of life in America hardly look like a
free sprint across a level playing field.
And so there is great attraction to the idea that, if one is going to
provide college tuition vouchers for college students, then one should
provide something for the non-college-bound as well. It might seem
unfair to do otherwise. Even if the concept of unfairness seems too
strong, one might still believe that there are political advantages to
coupling a college voucher program for the haves with a different car
rot for the have-nots.
As before, one must not mistake the universal distribution of
equal-sized grants for the achievement of true equality. Indeed, the
authors surely exaggerate when they suggest that universal $80,000
grants would enable all young high school graduates to "enjoy the
kind of relative economic independence that many children of the up
per middle class take for granted today" (pp. 192-93). Upper-middle
class children carry a lifelong advantage in the form of priceless cul
tural and social capital.30 They may draw on their parents' experience
and sophistication for valuable advice at critical moments. Moreover,
preexisting wealth differences will leave intact the distinction between
those who graduate from college with small amounts of debt and those
who emerge with enough wealth to attend graduate school or start a
business, buy a house, and pay for their own children's private
schooling - thereby perpetuating their privileged position into the
next generation. Indeed, to the extent that stakeholding increases ac
cess to private university education at the undergraduate level, the
that each additional year of schooling increases wages by 12-16%); Paul E. Gabriel, Esti
mating the Returns to College: A Longitudinal Analysis, 2 APPLIED ECON. LE1TERS 255
(1995) (estimating 12-15% rate of return for white males completing four years of college
during early 1980s). To be sure, not everyone experiences the success the averages describe.
Wrong economic choices are nonetheless made: students major in dying fields, or they fol
low their hearts into the arts and humanities and never earn enough to repay their debts.
But it seems to make little sense to relieve college graduates entirely of the consequences of
their choices (some of which might in fact have improved their lives in countless nonmone
tary ways), particularly if the only way to do so is to take on the added cost of subsidizing
those who achieve economic success.
30. See PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN
EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE (Richard Nice trans., SAGE Publications 1977)
(1970); see also Malamud, supra note 18, at 1880-82.
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likely result will be that a private university degree will have less social
value than it does at present. Graduate school or other indicia of so
cial status will simply replace it as a badge of distinction.31
The distribution of an equal demogrant would surely not produce
equal opportunity. Equal opportunity would of course require the
least advantaged to receive more assistance than the most advantaged.
Still, equal demogrants would provide more equal opportunity than
the status quo. Would they provide minimally fair opportunity to all?
Suppose that by that term we mean that people with talent should, in a
country as wealthy as America today, have at least the minimum re
sources necessary to develop that talent. Surely for many people, the
assured knowledge that they could afford to pay for college would
make the difference between not having that minimal level of hope
and having it. For others, whose talents call for entrepreneurial capi
tal and/or experiences that college cannot provide, an $80,000 cash
stake might not be enough. Suppose, instead, that what we mean by
minimally fair opportunity is that all Americans ought to have the
"equivalent" resources (p. 58) to protect themselves from the indigni
ties of reversals of economic fortune. Why is it so clear that "equiva
lence" can be achieved with merely equal resources when the likeli
hood of economic misfortune is so much greater for those without
college degrees?
But that only brings us back to earlier questions. Why were
Ackerman and Alstott unwilling to provide truly equal demogrants to
all? Why did they choose to make the non-college-bound wait until
age twenty-one? Why do the non-college-bound receive their stakes
over a period of four years - a schedule that makes sense for the
payment of college tuition but may not make sense for house down
payments, business start-ups, or other legitimate uses of the funds?
Why did they decide to provide a financially inferior stake to those
who fail to complete high school?
The limitations not only compromise the program's steps toward
equality, they strike us as being equally inconsistent with their other
guiding principle - antipaternalism. For when all else fails, the entire
program makes perfectly clear that the authors believe that attending
college - preferably a private college - is the right thing to do.
Those who do not finish high school are deemed undeserving and
31. For the dynamic nature of social hierarchies, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE
NOBILITY 277 (Laurette C. Cfough trans., 1996) (1989) (distinguishing between "upward
mobility" and "structural shift" - the latter being present when a seeming improvement in
credentials or occupation in fact merely maintains a person's status relative to others who
are also "upwardly mobile"); see also CULTIVATING DIFFERENCES:
SYMBOLIC
BOUNDARIES AND THE MAKING OF INEQUALITY 5 (Michele Lamont & Marcel Fournier
eds., 1992) ("According to Bourdieu, if there is a principle of organization to all forms of
social life, it is the logic of distinction. In any differentiated society, individuals, groups, and
social classes cannot escape this logic - which brings them together while separating them
from one another.").
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treated accordingly. Those who finish high school but do not attend
college receive full (if delayed) stakes, but both the size of the stake
and its division into four-year increments make it clear to all that the
program was not created with their needs in mind. A paternalist
might well endorse the view that college graduation is vital for eco
nomic survival in the modern American economy. Ackerman and
Alstott eschew paternalism. But how else can their program be just
ified?
***

Permit us to shift our focus now, from matters of substance to mat
ters of rhetoric. In writing their book, Ackerman and Alstott chose to
use three rhetorical tropes that are so distracting that it becomes diffi
cult to engage the substance of their proposals. None of them would
be worthy of mention if it were an isolated exception in a 220-page
book. But each is characteristic here, and together they warrant criti
cal comment.
The first trope might be called "overclaim now, qualify later."
This is a kind of intellectual bait-and-switch, whereby the authors as
sociate AAP with an extraordinarily lofty ideal, and then, later, admit
that, of course, AAP realizes that ideal only incompletely. In their
most exuberant voice, Ackerman and Alstott claim that stakeholding
offers Americans:
• "real equality of opportunity" (p. 7);
• a "fair chance to pursue happiness" (p. 9);
• "a fair share of the patrimony left by preceding generations"
(p. 9);
• "a priceless buffer against the predictable shocks of the marketplace" (p. 10);
• "a cushion in hard times and a source of entrepreneurial energy
in better ones" (p. 10);
• "a beacon of hope" "[f]or those growing up in the ghettos of
America" (p. 10);
• "economic independence for all" (pp. 11, 25), and
• "a genuine alternative to social division and moral drift" (p. 217).
At other points, they make surprisingly broad claims about the collat
eral effects of their proposal:
• "[Stakeholding] will
. . inject much-needed competition among
universities for the stakeholding dollar" (pp. 10, 53).
• "[S]takeholding will create a certain space for civic reflection . . . "
(p. 185).
·

.
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"[S]takeholding will also encourage a purer form of patriotism"
(p. 186).
We don't mind bold claims, but something is amiss here. These are
not the conclusions that follow upon pages of analysis. They come as
disembodied pronouncements in the text, and then become the prem
ises for further discussion. Perhaps that is an appropriate way to write
a lobbyist's brief. But it is frustrating and confusing for someone who
is just trying to figure out what direction public policy ought to be
take.
Nor is the problem ameliorated when, in other passages, the
authors seem to be making much more modest claims:
• "We do not suppose that our proposal suffices to achieve the
ideal of equal opportunity. Not only educational reform but the
special problems posed by serious physical or mental handicaps
are beyond the scope of our initiative" (p. 34).
• "To be sure, it only takes one large step toward equal opportu
nity" (p. 42).
• "Stakeholding cannot directly compensate for differentials in
early education and childhood experiences. But it can guarantee
access for all college-ready students regardless of their parents'
income and wealth" (p. 52).
• "Even if stakeholding were adopted, we would be far from an
America in which all children began adult life with first-rate edu
cations and roughly equal resources, regardless of their parents'
success or failure in the marketplace" (p. 103).
Rather than helping to clarify the authors' broader claims, these more
measured statements serve only to exacerbate our confusion about
why the aggressive claims were made in the first place.
The second trope is a seemingly unembarrassed misanthropy, di
rected at everyone but the solid college-attending upwardly mobile
middle class. Ackerman and Alstott patronize the working class and
demonize the wealthy. Four examples (again, the emphasis is ours):
., "Joe Six-Pack is every bit as much of an American as Joe Col
lege . . . . Because these high school graduates are not going to
college, they will have to wait until their twenties to gain access to
their stakes. But we do not think that this delay will prove very
controversial. Most high school graduates would themselves con
cede that they need some seasoning in the school of hard knocks
before they can be trusted with eighty thousand dollars" (p. 56).
o "[A larger stake would be unwise . . . .] [W]ould it really be good
to transform the average American into a spoiled brat living in
New York on an overly large trust fund?" (p. 192).
•
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"It will be easy for culture critics to sneer as Joe American uses
his stake to agonize over the car he should buy or the clothes he
should wear" (p. 192).
• "Some spoiled brats from the suburbs will blow their stakes, while
millions of poor kids from the center city will make the most of
their one big chance" (p. 197).
What kind of intellectual work is all this doing? Maybe it is merely
intended to show that Ackerman and Alstott want everyone to be
more like the solid American scion of the middle class - Joe College.
Maybe it is intended to show that members of the working classes Joe Six-Pack or Joe American - are hopelessly vain and must pass
through the crucible of hard experience before achieving the rational
temperament that is the middle-class birthright. The fact that some
"hard knocks" have long-term negative consequences seems not to
matter to the authors as they insist that members of the working
classes wait an extra four years to start working toward economic
adulthood. Maybe these comments are intended to show that the
wealthy and the suburbanite young adults are really spoiled brats for
whom we should have no sympathy. Coming from two members of
the Yale Law School faculty, however, it all reads as decidedly inap
propriate. What is the point of antipaternalism if it is mixed with such
obvious disrespect?
Through their negative typecasting of all but the solid college
attending middle class, the authors miss much of the moral drama that
will face the new stakeholders from sub-middle-class families. Young
adults will be under tremendous moral pressure to use stake resources
to help other members of their families - be it parents, grandparents,
or non-stake-eligible siblings. Young African Americans will likely
feel particularly strong pressure in this regard, both because their ex
tended families are more likely to experience economic downturns32
and because the cultural norms of the community lean toward greater
interdependency.33 Women will face particularly harsh choices. A
woman can bet on the stability of her marriage and use her stake funds
to substitute for her paycheck in order to stay home with her children
- or, instead, she can look at the hard statistics on divorce in this
country34 and take a marriage-threatening stand by investing in her
•

32 See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 967-88 (1997) (describing the economic precariousness of the
Black middle class).
33. See John Simpkins, All in the Family, The NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1996, at 27, 27
("[T]his endless succession of family obligations can make it impossible to accumulate
wealth. Everyone survives, but people with the ability and opportunity are prevented from
moving ahead."); see also Rose Merry Rivers & John Scanzoni, Social Families Among
African Americans: Policy Implications for Children, in B LACK FAMILIES 333, 341-43
(Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed., 3d ed. 1997).
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own education and career. The authors acknowledge the difficult
choices young adults will face.35 But they trivialize these choices when
they insist on characterizing young people as vain, ignorant, short
sighted, or spoiled.
The third stylistic trope is a willingness to construct hypothetical
straw critics of their proposal (styled as welfarists, libertarians, or
communitarians), and then to caricature and ridicule them. Once
again, a few examples should illustrate the point (here, too, the em
phasis is ours):
• "This question [whether there should be restrictions on how a
stake is used] bears the mark of the welfarist mindset" (p. 9).
• "We do not join those who would cheerfully sweep away the leg
islative achievements of the Progressives, the New Deal, and the
Great Society" (p. 1 1).
• "[T]he libertarian would have us ignore the more subtle, yet still
pervasive, ways in which educational inequalities shape the future
capacities of children to form and achieve their objectives in later
life" (p. 23).
• "We disagree [with communitarians] . .
. It is simply silly to sup
pose that elected politicians, of all people, could lead a sensitive
moral dialogue . . " (p. 43).
• "At this point, we expect, libertarians will begin squirming . . . .
But . . . [o]ur hypothetical libertarian has cried 'thief one time too
often in condemning the trusteeship tax [a proposed annual tax
equal to 2% of wealth]" (pp. 85-86).
Once again, we do not understand what intellectual work these pas
sages are doing. Why are Ackerman and Alstott bothering to respond
to critics who are imprisoned by their mindsets, who would cheerfully
sweep achievements away, who ignore subtleties, who make silly sup
positions about the capacities of politicians, and who cry thief? Why
are they not identifying the more serious questions about their pro
posal and simply addressing them?
.

.

***

These rhetorical distractions might be only minor distractions if
they were only a little bit of clutter in a book that was willing to de34. See, e.g., Larry L. Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions Between
Demographic and Institutional Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 485 (1990) (projecting that
60% of first marriages will end in divorce if current trends persist).
35. They in fact seem to endorse the choice to stay at home, saying that "[i]n the short
term, stakeholding will enhance the power of women to make the most sensible accommoda
tion to an unjust reality." See pp. 207-08. Sensible for whom? The children, or the women
in marriages of which half will end in divorce?
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fend its premises head-on. But The Stakeholder Society is not that
book.
Take, for example, the antipatemalist premise. Over the past
three decades, several prominent economists and policy analysts have
supported the idea of giving every young person a "human capital ac
count" that could be used for education and training over the course
of their lives.36 Ackerman and Alstott dismiss such proposals as fol
lows:
[A]s a matter of principle, we reject this notion of freedom-within
boundaries. . . . [A] large middle group will be denied real freedom. For
them, building 'human capital' may not be the best life plan. . . . [T]hey
may put a premium on some seemingly frivolous, but to them important,
item like foreign travel or an unforgettable wedding. We believe that
these young men and women should be no less free than their college
bound peers or the richer kids across town who are making similar deci
sions with their parents' money. We are repelled by programs that require
kids from the wrong side of the tracks to justify their lives to a government
bureaucrat. [pp. 215-216; emphasis added]

Ackerman and Alstott do not seem to care that this form of argu
ment proves way too much. As far as they are concerned, once one
has decided to use a public program to transfer resources to a recipi
ent, any restrictions on the use of those resources become threats to
both liberty (the recipient's freedom to choose without having to an
swer to a "government bureaucrat") and equality (the recipient's abil
ity to be as frivolous as a richer kid).
This principle would seem to require that all in-kind programs,
from public schools to food stamps, from subsidized housing to Medi
caid, be "cashed out." Universal health care would be an infringement
on the individual's right to buy cigarettes rather than penicillin. The
fact that in-kind programs have expanded rapidly in America over the
past thirty years, while cash programs have stagnated, might lead one
to wonder why the general public has missed Ackerman and Alstott's
point.
The answer is that, in a capitalist economy rooted in a conception
of private property, the collective decision to tax and redistribute is
morally significant. It involves a joint decision to infringe on the
"freedom" of the taxpayer. The principles that justify that decision,
grounded in commitments to the collective good, serve just as well to
justify restrictions on the "freedom" of the recipient. If the reason to
take money away from the rich is that we want to enhance opportuni
ties for the less fortunate, that same reason is perfectly adequate to say
36. Ackerman and Alstott's cites include ROBERT HAVEMAN, STARTING EVEN 168-71
{1988); James Tobin, Raising the Incomes of the Poor, in AGENDA FOR THE NATION 77, 9293 (Kermit Gordon ed., 1968); and William A. Klein, A Proposal for a Universal Personal
Capital Account, 268 n.56 (Institute for Research on Poverty Working Paper No. 422-77,
1977).

1502

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 98:1482

that we want to spend the money in ways that will have that effect for
more than just a day.
That brings us to our final criticism. Ackerman and Alstott have
proposed a very expensive program. The $255 billion per year they
propose to spend on stakeholding is almost as much as the nation cur
rently spends on public primary and secondary education.37 But they
offer no reason why anyone not hobbled by their self-imposed antipa
ternalism constraint would choose to spend the money on stakehold
ing rather than on programs targeted at the needs of the most disad
vantaged members of our society. For Ackerman and Alstott, "the
point of stakeholding," first and foremost, "is to liberate each citizen
from government" (p. 9). But for many of their readers - and cer
tainly for us - the point of social spending on this scale should be to
liberate the most disadvantaged among us from their dire unmet social
and economic needs. While we are very cognizant that social and eco
nomic inequalities are meaningful and are a matter of concern even
when they occur among those in the upper half of the American in
come distribution,38 we find the unmet needs of those in the bottom
half far more compelling on a moral level.
If we had $255 billion a year to spend, we would spend it on pro
grams aimed at the massive inequalities experienced by poor children
in their early years. Consider the case of families with one child, un
der the age of six years old. About 40% of them have annual incomes
of $50,000 a year or more; 10% have incomes of more than $100,000
per year. But over a million such families - 18% of the total - have
less than $15,000 in annual income.39 Rates of childhood poverty vary
by race and ethnicity: in 1998, 10.6% of non-Hispanic White children
were living in poverty, compared with 34.4% of Hispanic children and
36.7% of Black children.40 The disproportionate concentration of
poverty within certain minority groups provides still another reason
why we align ourselves with those who find the greatest moral signifi
cance in the needs of America's least fortunate.41
The problem is that poverty programs, to be effective, need gov
ernment. They need social workers. They need people with expertise
37. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1999 tbl. 512 {119th ed. 1999) [hereinafter 1999 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT], <http://www.census.gov/govs/school/96tables.pdf> {showing U.S. expenditures
of $264,240,000,000 and $279, 353,000,000 for fiscal year 1995 and 1996, respectively).
38. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 18.
39. See U.S. Census Bureau, Income in the United States: 1998 (P60-206) tbl. 5 {last re
vised Mar. 3, 2000), <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income98.htm>.
40. See id. app. B, tbl. B-2.
41. See, e.g., GOSTA EsPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE
CAPITALISM {1990); ROBERT G. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE {1988); Thomas c. Grey,
Poverty and Need: The Welfare State and Theories ofDistributive Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV.
877 {1976).
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that poor parents lack. They are paternalistic at their core. And they
are expensive. Ackerman and Alstott report that the sums we now
spend on Project Headstart are "piddling," that a "first-class program"
along the outlines of Headstart would cost billions of dollars, and that
"our society's failure to make such basic investments in its youngest
and most vulnerable citizens is simply scandalous" (p. 28) .
Why, then, divert $255 billion of scarce funds to a stakeholding
program? Why dress that program in the rhetoric of "equal opportu
nity," and encourage people to believe in the moral fault of those who
do not survive the inequalities of childhood and emerge as
stakeholders? If a prior commitment to antipaternalism is the reason,
why not write a more humble book, one that admits the social costs of
antipatemalism and plainly advocates stakeholding as the best an anti
paternalist can do? Why not go even further and reevaluate antipa
ternalism - especially if antipaternalism means stakeholding is the
best we can do?

